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Over-represented but not Understood: Sentencing Provisions as an Inadequate Response to the 
Over incarceration of Aboriginal Peoples in Nova Scotia. 
 
By Brady Reid 
 
Abstract 
This paper will explore the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Nova Scotia. It will 
critically examine s. 718.2(e) as well as R. vs Gladue 1999 as a response to the over-representation 
of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons. In 1996, Bill C41 was introduced which defined the 
principles of sentencing for judges across the country and included a provision (s. 718.2(e)) that 
mandated judges to consider the situation of all Aboriginal offenders. However, over twenty years 
later, evidence demonstrates that the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders has not decreased. 
This paper will analyze ten sentencing decisions from the Nova Scotia Provincial Court in order 
to understand better the implementation of s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999. The results show 
that its use in court is inconsistent and inadequate to combat over incarceration. While judges 
recognize and identify the challenges faced by many Aboriginal offenders, they are still bound by 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will  
always glorify the hunter.”  Chinua Achebe 
 
 
I come from a town on the West Coast of Newfoundland where the paper mill dominates the 
local economy. I come from a town on the West Coast of Newfoundland where the bay used to 
freeze over during the winter, but no longer does. I come from a town on the West Coast of 
Newfoundland where I lived down the street from my entire family. I am a member of the Qalipu 
Mi’kmaq First Nation. My lived experiences do not represent those of Aboriginal1 people as they 
are normally discussed in scholarly literature. Instead, my lived experiences represent that of a 
boy who, through lineage from both maternal and paternal family members, is tied to Mi’kmaw 
peoples that have existed in Newfoundland for centuries2. It has taken me many years to build up 
the courage to put who I am into writing due to the fear that I have of claiming Aboriginal status. 
Questioning and doubting my identity is something that I have done for many years. I struggle 
with the concept of Aboriginality in my writing as it relates to self-identification as Aboriginal. 
My family does not live on reserve land; I do not feel any direct or indirect impacts of the 
residential school system nor do I actively participate in cultural activities within the Qalipu 
Mi’kmaq community. These are some of the characteristics that come to mind when thinking of 
any Aboriginal person. Despite the piece of plastic in my wallet legally defining me as 
Aboriginal, I hesitate to claim status because I am unable to identify with who traditionally has 
been seen as Aboriginal.  
                                                          
1 The term Aboriginal, as defined by the Canadian Government, is used in this paper to refer to a person identifying 
as First Nations (North American Indian), Métis or Inuk (Inuit) (Constitution Act, 1982, Section 35 (2))  
2 The island of Newfoundland has been considered part of Mi’kmaq territory for many centuries; however, it was 
not until 2011 that the Qalipu First Nations Band was formally recognized as another Mi’kmaq band in 
Newfoundland (Hanrahan, 2012).  
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Evidently, I am quite reflexive when thinking about my Aboriginal status and this has 
subsequently piqued my interest in Aboriginal issues more generally. The over incarceration of 
Aboriginal offenders is extensively discussed in the scholarly literature (Dioso & Doob, 2001; 
Roberts & Melchers, 2003; Latimer & Foss, 2005; Welsh & Ogloff, 2008; Balfour, 2012). 
Furthermore, as a response to the notable over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian 
prisons, the federal government introduced sentencing reforms in 1996. Newly introduced 
provision s. 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code mandates sentencing judges to consider the 
“circumstances of Aboriginal offenders” in their decisions (Bill C41, 1996). Though generally 
highlighted across Canada as an issue that is increasingly discussed among policy makers and 
stakeholders in the Criminal Justice System, little research has been conducted in Nova Scotia on 
the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders and the implementation of s. 718.2(e). 
Within my project, as I have indirectly discussed above, I position myself as an 
insider/outsider. Anti-oppressive research discusses at length the relationship between the 
researcher and the participants, the former coming from a position of privilege and the latter 
coming from the community being studied (Mason and Stubbs, 2010). Though I identify as 
Aboriginal, I have not experienced much of the hardship and marginalization that have affected 
many Aboriginal communities. To that effect, I consider myself an insider to the point that I am 
also Aboriginal. However, I separate myself as an outsider because I have never been involved 
with the criminal justice system nor have suffered direct disadvantage as a result of my heritage. 
Even though I am not conducting research on individuals where my positionality drastically 
alters the data that I am able to extract, I still feel a certain degree of tension. Considering the 
values of anti-oppressive research, research that is conducted with marginalized or oppressed 
communities should benefit the community itself, not just add to the body of knowledge on a 
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particular topic (Gobo, 2011). Thus, I question whether my research could possibly benefit the 
Aboriginal community in Nova Scotia or if I am just using my positionality as a privileged 
researcher in academia to add to the body of knowledge surrounding Aboriginal offenders. This 
question is important as I undertake research, however, I am able to ease my conscious by doing 
qualitative research that does not involve any human participants. I do not feel that I am 
undermining Aboriginal people directly in my research and I am still able to join in the academic 
discussion around Aboriginal over incarceration in Canada and Nova Scotia.  
In this paper, I will be looking at both a sentencing provision found in the Criminal Code, 
section 718.2(e), as well as a Supreme Court Case, R. vs. Gladue 1999, in regards to Aboriginal 
offenders. Before going into any detail about each aspect, it is important to understand the 
relationship between s. 718.2(e) and R vs. Gladue 1999. Section 718.2(e) was a sentencing 
provision that was introduced in 1996 that mandates sentencing judges to consider the 
circumstances of all Aboriginal offenders before giving a sentence. This provision acts as an 
indicator to sentencing judges to remember the historical disadvantage that Aboriginal 
communities have experienced and to take this into consideration in sentencing. Three years after 
the implementation of s. 718.2(e), the provision was used in a Federal case that set significant 
precedence for future trials involving Aboriginal offenders. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada set the benchmark for the interpretation of section 
718.2(e) in its decision of R. vs. Gladue. Jamie Gladue, an Aboriginal woman living off-reserve 
in British Columbia, pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the death of her common law husband, an 
Aboriginal man. At sentencing, the trial judge noted several mitigating factors, such as being a 
young mother as well as having upgraded her education and attended alcohol abuse counselling 
(Rudin, 2008). Despite the mitigating factors identified by the judge and Gladue’s status as an 
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Aboriginal person, the Supreme Court ruled that the crime was “a very serious one” and thus 
warranted three years’ imprisonment (R. vs Gladue, 1999, p 3). Though not overturning the trial 
judge’s sentence of incarceration, the Supreme Court narrowed the interpretation of s. 718.2(e) in 
the Criminal Code (Roach and Rudin, 2000). The term “narrowed” refers to the idea that the 
precedent outlined by the judge in R vs. Gladue 1999 delineated the limits under which s. 
718.2(e) was relevant. In effect, s. 718.2(e) was no longer able to play a large role in cases 
dealing with repeat offenders, serious offences, or dangerous offenders.  
To that end, I will be reviewing ten sentencing decisions from the Provincial Court of 
Nova Scotia to better understand how s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999 are interpreted by 
sentencing judges. Through a lens of restorative justice, I argue that sentencing provisions 
implemented in the Criminal Code of Canada are not an adequate response to the over 
incarceration of Aboriginal peoples. Sentencing provisions continue to exist within the 
traditional justice system that has systematically disadvantaged Aboriginal offenders therefore it 
is unable to solve the problem that it itself created. The language used by each judge is unique to 





Context and Background 
Despite being the first inhabitants of the land that is now called Canada, Aboriginal peoples 
continue to be disenfranchised in the country that was formed around them. The effects of the 
marginalization of Aboriginal peoples range from staggering unemployment rates, lack of 
opportunity, and economic deprivation due to substance abuse, alienation, and community 
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fragmentation (Welsh and Ogloff, 2008). This marginalization is tangibly visible in the Criminal 
Justice System; a system that is heavily saturated with Aboriginal peoples from across the 
country. Due to the many long-lasting effects of the processes of colonization such as the 
creation of reserves and residential school, Aboriginal peoples across the country face a higher 
chance of being involved in the Criminal Justice System (Murdocca, 2013).  
In their longitudinal study of incarceration rates in Canada from 19782001, Roberts and 
Melchers (2003) found that Aboriginal offenders are distinctly overrepresented in Canadian 
prisons. In 2001, “Aboriginal offenders accounted for 19% of provincial admissions … but only 
3.3% of the population” (p. 211). The findings of this study suggest that the attempts of 
Parliament as well as the Supreme Court have not led to great reductions in the number of 
Aboriginal peoples admitted to custody, with the biggest decline visible from 1993 to 1994. 
However, Roberts and Melchers (2003) argue again that non-Aboriginal admissions into prison 
have gone down at an even faster rate. In this sense, it is evident that while the incarceration rates 
of Aboriginal offenders are not rising, they are decreasing at a slower rate than those of non-
Aboriginal offenders. Therefore, the percentage of Aboriginal people in prison is increasing 
while the actual number of incarcerated Aboriginal people is not increasing. This over 
incarceration of Aboriginal offenders is highlighted by many other scholars producing literature 
in this field (Roach and Rudin, 2000; Dioso and Doob, 2001; Welsh and Ogloff, 2008; Balfour, 
2012; Murdocca, 2013).  
Despite the disproportionate representation of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons, 
there is no consensus regarding the reasons that have led to this overrepresentation. Instead, the 
literature suggests the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders occurs as a result of the 
intersection of a variety of different “social disorders” linked with colonization and colonial 
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ideologies that have leaked into the twenty-first century (Murdocca, 2009; Macmillan, 2011). 
Since the Europeans first made contact with the ancestors of the current Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada, Aboriginal peoples have been forced to conform to the colonial traditions of the settlers. 
As the European settlers expanded their presence in Canada, Aboriginal peoples were allotted 
small, poorly located reserves with little natural resources. Many Aboriginal communities 
became impoverished because of their inability to continue a subsistent lifestyle on reserve land 
(Isaacs, 2014). While reserves still exist across the country, Balfour (2012) argues that “prisons 
have been denounced as [the] ‘neo-colonial reserve’” (p. 86). Balfour positions incarceration as 
another means by which Aboriginal communities are segregated from the general population. 
The important argument made by Balfour highlights the relationship between colonial practices 
such as the formation of reserves or residential schools and the overrepresentation of Aboriginal 
offenders in the Criminal Justice System.  
In response to the disproportionate number of Aboriginal offenders in Canadian prisons, 
the Federal Government introduced Bill C41,3 which presented several amendments to the 
Criminal Code. Specifically, this new legislation outlined reforms to the judicial sentencing of 
offenders within the Criminal Justice System. The bill was passed in Canada in 1995 and enacted 
for the first time in the spring of 1996 (Snell and Bourassa, 1995). Bill C41 outlined the 
purpose of sentencing, introduced conditional sentences, and emphasized the availability of 
alternative measures programs, among other provisions. In particular, targeted attention was 
given to Aboriginal offenders with the introduction of section 718.2(e) in the sentencing portion 
of the Criminal Code. Section 718.2(e) reads as follows, “All available sanctions other than 
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, 
                                                          
3 Introduced in 1995, passed in 1996 and enacted in 1996 (Snell and Bourassa, 1995) 
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with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal4 offenders” (Snell and Bourasses, 
1995, p. 4)  
Section 718.2(e) attempted to divert Aboriginal offenders away from incarceration by 
mandating judges to consider alternate options for sentencing. However, Balfour (2012) 
concluded that since the introduction of sentencing reforms such as Bill C41 in 1996, 
incarceration rates for Aboriginal peoples have continued to rise. It is then critical to question the 
purpose and effectiveness of legislation reforms as a means to address the over incarceration of 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada: Has Bill C41 been successful in accomplishing its goal. In a 
short and succinct answer, it has not. According to the annual report on corrections in Canada, 
Howard Sapers identifies that in January of 2016, “25% of the inmate population in federal 
penitentiaries is now comprised of Indigenous people” (p. 43), which represents an almost 8% 
increase since the Roberts and Melchers study in 2003. Much of the scholarly literature that 
followed the introduction of Bill C41 has problematized the idea of using a colonial structure 
such as the Criminal Code as a remedy to an issue that was itself created by the process of 
colonization (Adjin-Tettey, 2007; Murdocca, 2009 and 2013; Roach, 2014). Several common 
themes become apparent when conducting a review of the literature surrounding section 718.2(e) 
of the Criminal Code and the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canada. Sentencing 
reforms, the interpretation of section 718.2(e), and the non-legal factors affecting sentencing are 
three overarching themes common to the literature.          
 
                                                          
4 Although I use an uppercase “A” throughout this paper writing the word Aboriginal, this word was kept lowercase 
in order to keep the integrity of the quotation. 
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Sentencing Reforms 
In response to the many issues that plague the Criminal Justice System, the federal government 
often turns to legislative reforms to heal any wounds. Aside from the introduction of sentencing 
reforms through Bill C41, scholars have critically analyzed commissions of inquiry as a 
solution to a specific problem. The scholars try to determine how effective legislation can be in 
exacting justice. 
Donald Marshall Jr. was a 17-year-old Mi’kmaw youth living in Cape Breton, Nova 
Scotia in 1971 when he was convicted of second-degree murder. However, 11 years later, he was 
granted an acquittal when new evidence was introduced that proved his innocence. As a result, 
he received 1.5 million dollars as compensation for wrongfully spending 11 years in prison 
(Hickman, Poitras & Evans, 1989). Furthermore, the Nova Scotia Provincial Government 
produced the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution which critically 
analysed the trial and highlighted the discrimination faced by Marshall Jr. throughout the 
proceedings. Finally, this Commission presented over 80 recommendations to be adopted to 
ensure that the injustice suffered by Marshall Jr. was never experienced by another offender. 
Analysing the Marshall Inquiry that followed the release of Marshall Jr., Manette (1988) 
highlights the inappropriateness of using the Marshall Inquiry as a “vehicle for juridical 
reflexivity” (p. 167). In other words, Manette discusses the ineffectiveness of a Royal 
Commission as a tool used by judicial officials to recognize their mistakes and to improve their 
practice. The study highlights how one might understand the purpose of a commission of inquiry 
as a vehicle to perpetuate hegemonic ideals; notably, dominant western ideologies of crime and 
punishment.  
In addition, as a response to the growing population of Aboriginal youth involved in the 
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Criminal Justice System, the Youth Criminal Justice Act was implemented in 2003. Outlined by 
Corrado, Keuhn, and Margaritescu (2014) this policy reform mandates that all Aboriginal young 
people be diverted for all first-time and non-serious offenses-restricting remand and prison to the 
most serious offences. A main objective of this act is “to reduce the use of the formal youth 
criminal justice system for minor offences through alternative measures such as diversion” 
(Corrado et al., 2014, p. 43).  
One of the most important reforms to legislation that was intended to have a large impact 
on the population of Aboriginal offenders was the introduction of section 718.2(e) in the 
Criminal Code. Reforms to sentencing legislation in Canada “were intended to address general 
criticisms of judicial sentencing practices and, specifically, Aboriginal overrepresentation” in the 
Criminal Justice System (Welsh and Ogloff, 2008, p. 493). The general principle underlying 
section 718.2(e) is to avoid the use of imprisonment as the main avenue for sentencing 
Aboriginal offenders and instead use community resources to rehabilitate offenders.  
The sentencing reforms of 1996 were introduced through Bill C41 to codify the purpose 
of sentencing and to “reduce the use of incarceration” of Aboriginal offenders (p. 86). Dioso and 
Doob suggest in their paper that the Government of Canada positioned their policy reforms 
(718.2(e)) in 1996 so as to be more appealing to the public. Instead of addressing the actual 
fundamental problems of the social and economic situation of Aboriginal peoples that contribute 
to higher levels of offending and therefore greater involvement with the Criminal Justice System, 
the Canadian government placed a bandage over the issue with section 718.2(e). Dioso and Doob 
argue that this bandage has been widely received as a solution to the underlying causes of 
Aboriginal over incarceration. Section 718.2(e) becomes “more legitimate” (p. 407) through the 
way in which the government frames the reforms.  
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As aforementioned, the study conducted by Roberts and Melchers in 2003 demonstrates 
that the attempts of the Canadian government to dramatically reduce the incarceration of 
Aboriginal offenders was unsuccessful. The authors note that overall incarceration rates were 
decreasing yet the incarceration rate of non-Aboriginal offenders from 19782001 was 
decreasing at a much faster pace than that of Aboriginal offenders. Roberts and Melchers (2003) 
argue that since the incarceration of non-Aboriginal offenders has decreased at an even faster 
rate, the “specific policy changes are not responsible for the Aboriginal decline” (p.212) The 
argument made by Roberts and Melchers is one that is supported by the work of many scholars 
who study the incarceration rates of Aboriginal offenders. For example, Welsh and Ogloff 
(2008) state that “existing empirical research examining determinants of sentencing outcomes … 
does suggest that the Bill C41 statutory reforms may fail to adequately address 
overrepresentation” (p. 494). According to her quantitative study, Balfour (2012) posits that “in 
the nearly two decades that have passed since the enactment of the legislation, incarceration rates 
for Aboriginal peoples have continued to rise, especially for Aboriginal women” (p. 86).  
In contrast with Balfour’s assertion, Roach and Rudin (2000) highlight that using 
718.2(e) as a solution to reduce the over incarceration of Aboriginal people is important yet 
“ambitious” (p. 358). This study examines the decision in R. vs. Gladue 1999 as a promising 
decision as it recognizes Aboriginal over incarceration in Canadian prisons. However, it also 
highlights that “the most ambiguous part of Gladue is its applicability to serious offences” (p. 
365). In R vs. Gladue 1999, the appeal judge dismissed the application for appeal because, 
despite the mitigating factors that were present, the judge believed that the original appeal judges 
had inappropriately interpreted s. 718.2(e) and that the seriousness of the offence outweighed the 
defendant’s identity and the colonial context of Aboriginal peoples. On the contrary, Roach 
    Over-Represented but not Understood  14 
 
(2014) rebounds in saying that the silver lining in the Gladue case was that she got day parole 
after 6 months and was ordered to reside with her father, “the type of conditional release as an 
alternative to imprisonment that should be encouraged by the case” (p. 366). 
In her aforementioned study, Carmela Murdocca provides an in depth critique of section 
718.2(e) as a response to the over incarceration of Aboriginal peoples. Structured as “appeals to 
cultural difference” (p. 4), Murdocca argues that restorative approaches in sentencing entrench 
further certain forms of racism and sexism. Section 718.2(e) perpetuates the idea that Aboriginal 
offenders are overrepresented in Canadian prisons due to “cultural differences” which could be 
embodied as the “social disorders” faced by Aboriginal communities that Murdocca had coined 
in 2009. This undermines the form of structured marginalization that has had a tremendous 
impact on Aboriginal groups across Canada. 
Furthermore, McMillan (2011) problematizes the idea of using a contemporary Western 
framework of justice to address Aboriginal offenders. She states that many people, including 
legal professionals, believe that it is important to integrate customary Indigenous practices 
concerning Aboriginal offenders within a contemporary framework. McMillan (2011) highlights 
that this approach may “fulfill concerns of cultural appropriateness and fairness and are 
presented in opposition to the negative impacts of colonization and assimilative practices of the 
dominant society” (p.18081). It is important not to implement traditionally colonial practices of 
justice as a solution to an issue that has itself been caused by colonization. The difficulty in 
combining a contemporary legal framework and customary Indigenous practices lies in deciding 
what these customary practices are. Aboriginal communities across Canada are extremely 
diverse, which at times limits the generalizability of customary Indigenous legal practices.  
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Interpretation of Section 718.2(e) 
Dioso and Doob (2001) position the judge’s decision in R. vs. Gladue 1999 as 
“controversial for at least two reasons” (p. 405). First, this benchmark case created a divide 
between Aboriginal offenders and other offenders. In other words, s. 718.2(e) problematizes the 
sentencing of and mandates special consideration for Aboriginal offenders. Therefore, they argue 
that the injustices faced by other marginalized groups in the Criminal Justice System are 
undermined and seemingly overlooked. Second, R. vs. Gladue 1999 specifically highlights 
sentencing as the core issue in the overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders rather than “the 
more fundamental problem of the social and economic circumstances of Aboriginal people in 
Canada” (p. 406) Similar to Murdocca’s (2009) argument that provision 718.2(e) in the criminal 
code is inadequate in addressing the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders, Dioso and Doob 
suggest that attempting to divert Aboriginal offenders away from prison at sentencing is simply 
too late. They believe that action should be taken earlier to avoid interaction with the Criminal 
Justice System all together. 
Murdocca (2013) provides a detailed analysis of R v. Gladue 1999 and argues that s. 
718.2(e) is inconsistent in its interpretation. She highlights that the likelihood of diversion away 
from incarceration is dependent on how well the offender “performs” his or her Aboriginality 
and on how apparent the link is between their Aboriginality and the crime committed. To further 
explain the argument identified by Murdocca, Rudin (2008) provides a description of the 
interpretation of s. 718.2(e) in R. vs. Gladue. 
The Court wanted to make clear that while section 718.2(e) mandated a different way in 
which an Aboriginal person was to be sentenced, it did not mean that on all occasions an 
Aboriginal person would receive a different sentence than a non-Aboriginal person in 
similar circumstances. (p. 69697) 
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Basically, the sentencing judge must consider at what point the Aboriginality of an offender 
should receive more consideration than the aggravating factors in sentencing. This practice 
inherently undermines the historical marginalization faced by Aboriginal peoples as a whole and 
individualizes each offender, placing the onus on the accused to prove their Aboriginality and 
how it has impacted their behavior.    
In Canada, Aboriginal peoples have been incorporated into policy and law-making, such 
as s. 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code. However, in 2009, Murdocca outlined that Aboriginal 
peoples have been placed in “two mutually exclusive positions: the objects of worry and the 
consultants to their own problems” (p. 30). In short, in order to deal with the issue of the 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons, policy makers and other key 
actors in the Criminal Justice System have consulted with Aboriginal leaders. However, as 
Murdocca highlights, Aboriginal leaders that are brought into discussions around lawmaking and 
sentencing decisions must speak within the hegemonic discourse, (that was organized and is 
perpetuated by white society). Attempting to include Aboriginal leaders in the solution to over 
incarceration is problematic when the entire Criminal Justice System is built on colonial 
principles of deterrence and denunciation. Murdocca (2009) further highlights that “relating 
Aboriginal over-representation to social disadvantage (through various social indices) mis-states 
and over-simplifies a complex problem by ignoring the unique legacy of colonialism faced by 
Aboriginal people” (pg. 30). Adjin-Tettey (2007) adds that, “the over-incarceration of Aboriginal 
and other marginalized people reflects the legacies of colonization and is also evidence of their 
continuing victimization at the hands of the dominant white society” (p. 183). Unfortunately, the 
dominant white society in the Canadian context is also responsible for addressing the 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons. 
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One remaining form of colonization that continued well into the twentieth century is 
residential schools. Residential schools separated families in an effort to destroy Aboriginal 
culture and assimilate Aboriginal children into western society. The lasting effects of residential 
schools exist today in the organization of reserves and unstable family structures that are 
prevalent among Aboriginal communities (Roach, 2014). In 2012, an important case heard by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, R. vs. Ipeelee set a precedence for the broader legacy of residential 
schools being taken into account for Aboriginal offenders (Roach, 2014). However, there exists a 
large number of criminal courts that have required an Aboriginal offender to establish a direct 
relationship between their crime and residential schools. In some cases, the accused were able to 
prove the direct link between their connection to residential schools and their specific crime in 
question, yet this unnecessarily brings into question the negative impact of the residential school 
system on the Aboriginal community as a whole. In other cases, less consideration was given to 
the offender’s prior attendance at a residential school depending on the severity of the crime 
(Roach, 2014).  
 
Aggravating Factors in Sentencing 
It is interesting to note that the Government of Canada introduced s. 718.2(e) in the hopes of 
reducing discrimination against Aboriginal offenders at sentencing when much of the literature 
suggests that sentencing is not the main cause for the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. 
Latimer and Foss (2005) analysed the sentencing of Aboriginal youth and found that 
discrimination exists at several points in the Criminal Justice System. For example, in 1971, 
during the Donald Marshall Jr. murder-trial, there is evidence that indicates that the major actors 
involved in the trial were not practicing due process and instead simply pushed to convict 
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Marshall Jr. of the crime (Manette, 1988). Manette uncovers that the injustice suffered by 
Donald Marshall Jr. (and other Aboriginal offenders who face similar forms of discrimination) 
are caused by “human failures” among other things. These human failures can be understood as 
“racial attitudes, which prejudiced the normative functioning of judicial process” (p. 176). In 
short, Manette argues that the personal biases of the actors in the Criminal Justice System 
prevented them from investigating the case as objective parties and instead worked to prove that 
Marshall Jr. had committed the crime.  
These human failures are also present in HL vs. Canada 2005, wherein an Aboriginal 
offender who had been sexually assaulted at the age of 14 while attending a residential school 
was convicted of several alcohol-related offenses (Roach, 2014). HL appealed his case to the 
Court of Appeal, attempting to show that his criminal activity was directly related to trauma 
endured while at a residential school. The Court of Appeal concluded that HL’s “intentional 
acts” caused him to spend 40 months in prison and not the sexual assault at residential school. 
Roach (2014) outlines that in this case, HL was either considered “an innocent victim” of sexual 
assault or “a guilty offender” (p. 580), positions that were mutually exclusive from each other. 
This perception argues that the offender was acting independently, not as a result of his traumas 
and therefore undermines the impacts of colonization that s. 718.2(e) wishes to address.   
As highlighted by the literature surrounding incarceration rates of Aboriginal offenders, 
there is no one specific factor that stands out as the main contributor to the over incarceration of 
Aboriginal offenders. Instead, it is the intersection of a variety of factors that ultimately lead to 
higher incarceration rates for Aboriginal peoples. Balfour (2012) argues that the recurring 
explanation for the overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders in the Criminal Justice System is 
the socio-economic disadvantage of many Aboriginal communities.  For example, low income, 
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poor education, transiency, and unstable family structures are all prevalent realities for members 
in Aboriginal communities across Canada. Furthermore, McMillan (2011) adds: 
The impacts of the history of colonization, informed by the experiences of residential 
schools, economic marginalization, systemic racism, class stratification, altered gender 
and generational roles, and criminalization of Mi’kmaq ways of life, all influence how 
people talk about, perceive and experience justice (p. 180).  
 
McMillan highlights the effects that colonization has had on Aboriginal communities and 
therefore how it has altered their experience within the Criminal Justice System.  
Specifically related to sentencing, Welsh and Ogloff (2008) state that the Supreme Court 
of Canada lists a variety of contextual factors relevant to Aboriginal offenders, such as “years of 
dislocation and economic deprivation, high unemployment rates, lack of opportunity, substance 
abuse, loneliness, and community fragmentation” (p.494). With these socio-economic factors 
leading to a higher occurrence of aggravating factors such as prior federal convictions and 
violent offences, sentencing judges may be unable to adequately apply s. 718.2(e) when giving 
out a sentence (Welsh and Ogloff, 2008). The socio-economic disadvantage faced by Aboriginal 
people is further perpetuated by systemic segregation onto reserves (Balfour, 2012). In fact, 
Balfour (2012) presents several statistics about the employment levels of on-reserve Aboriginal 
peoples. She states that 52% of people living on reserve are members of the working class while 
44% of people on reserve are, in fact, unemployed (p.87). These staggering numbers of 
unemployed or poorly employed Aboriginal people on reserves is one poignant example of the 
socio-economic status in which most Aboriginal people find themselves. 
 In this chapter, I have unpacked some of the literature that has been written about 
Aboriginal offenders and justice inside Canadian courtrooms. As I have identified, little of this 
research exists in Nova Scotia. The next chapter will highlight the theoretical framework through 
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which I intend to structure my analysis as well as the methods that I will be using to gather 
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Chapter 2: Design of the Research 
“I have a dream that we won’t have to talk about ‘restorative justice’ because it will be 
understood that true justice is about restoration, and about transformation. I have a dream.” 
 Howard Zehr 
 
Theoretical Framework 
When addressing the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canadian prisons, the Federal 
government passed Bill C-41, which defined the principles of sentencing in the Criminal Justice 
System. It also included provision 718.2(e), which mandated sentencing judges to consider the 
unique circumstances of Aboriginal peoples when deciding on an appropriate sentence. 
However, Jane McMillan (2011) problematizes the idea of using a contemporary Western 
framework of justice to address Aboriginal offenders. While s. 718.2(e) may have been 
implemented to address the problem of over incarceration, the provision still exists within a 
traditional justice system that has historically disadvantaged Aboriginal peoples. McMillan 
asserts that to effectively combat the over-representation of Aboriginal offenders in prison, an 
alternative solution is more effective than continuing to use the system that perpetuates the 
marginalization of Aboriginal communities. Elliott (2011) agrees with this point when they state 
that, “the retributive system places the primary responsibility for issues like mental health, 
poverty, education and so on into the realm of criminal justice, which is not set up structurally or 
conceptually to address these issues” (p. 72).  Elliott furthers the argument that as the racialized 
principles of colonialism continue to systematically disadvantage Aboriginal communities, 
finding a solution within the retributive justice system is ineffective.  
 Elliott (2011) highlights the important difference between a retributive justice system and 
a restorative justice system. Retributive justice can be defined as “a violation of laws or rules, 
where culpability is determined and the guilty are punished” (p. 65). In this sense, an offender is 
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viewed as someone who has broken the law under their own authority and therefore must be 
punished accordingly. This is problematic because it neglects the impacts that social factors such 
as poverty or a lack of education can have on one’s ability to follow the law. Aboriginal people, 
for example, face higher rates of unemployment and substance abuse that stems from colonial 
practices such as the establishment of reserves or residential schools (Roach, 2014). In a 
retributive justice system, the consequences of colonialism are not considered and therefore 
systemic discrimination occurs when sentencing an Aboriginal offender. In contrast, restorative 
justice is an inclusive process that promotes the involvement of all stakeholders who have been 
impacted by the harm that has been caused. As a relational system, restorative justice works to 
repair the relationships that have been affected by the incident in a way that rehabilitates and 
reintegrates the offender back into the community (Elliott, 2011). Aboriginal offenders are able 
to benefit from restorative justice by having an opportunity to voice their story and hear other 
perspectives that can act as a vehicle for healing. Elliott (2011) argues that in order for 
restorative justice to be effective, it cannot exist within the current Criminal Justice System, 
instead it must be a new system with its own autonomy.  
It is possible to infer that the failure of Bill C41 to address the over incarceration of 
Aboriginal offenders has occurred because the government turned to the current retributive 
Criminal Justice System to solve a longstanding and complex issue. As such, I will be drawing 
on the literature surrounding restorative justice to better understand an Indigenous approach to 
justice. Through the wide lens of restorative justice, it will be possible to understand the pitfalls 
and consequences of relying on s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999 to directly address the over 
incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. 
 There is a close connection between traditional Indigenous interpretations of justice and 
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current restorative justice practices that exist across Canada. Hansen (2015) argues that “the 
downfall of Indigenous people in Canada and many other colonial countries is their alienation 
from their original justice systems” (p. 1). Since colonization, European settlers have attempted 
to divide Aboriginal peoples from their heritage which includes their language, culture, and 
forms of governance. Instead, Hansen (2015) argues that “what has been imposed on them is 
Western justice, more specifically, Western State-sanctioned justice; a retributive justice system 
that has been used to colonize and marginalize Indigenous peoples” (p. 1). Hansen further 
highlights the disconnection that exists between Aboriginal peoples in Canada and the Western 
justice system that is inherently biased and perpetuates their marginalization and disadvantage. 
In Manitoba in 1999, an Aboriginal Justice Inquiry was conducted by the provincial government. 
This inquiry asserts that “the purpose of a justice system in an Aboriginal society is to restore the 
peace and equilibrium within the community, and to reconcile the accused with his or her own 
conscience and with the individual or family who has been wronged” (p. 22). With such vast 
differences between Indigenous and Western forms of justice, the difficulty of addressing the 
over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canada through legislative means becomes evident. 
Currently, there are many institutions and justice associations that provide restorative justice 
opportunities for offenders across Canada. However, as Elliott (2011) highlights, restorative 
justice still works within the same retributive justice system to provide an alternative to punitive 
practices. 
The retributive justice system is fuelled by an “economic and capitalist ideology in which 
the main goal is economic development” (Monchalin, 2016, p. 259). This ideology was born out 
of colonization and thus colonial practices and principles are still very much a part of modern 
society. The retributive system works to serve punishment to an offender who has broken the law 
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and therefore defied the state. In essence, it is supposed to give out in punishment what it has lost 
through the crime. It pits the state against the criminal and makes both parties mutually exclusive 
from each other (Monchalin, 2016). 
 
Restorative Justice as an Alternative 
Elliott (2011) underlines a caution that has to be taken with defining restorative justice in a fixed, 
limited manner. In chapter four of Security with Care, she brings to light the challenge of 
“clarifying purist versus maximalist models of restorative justice, where the former is a voluntary 
cooperative approach and the latter comprises court-imposed sanctions. Concerns raised by 
purists raise the warning bell of co-optation” (p. 66). It is important to remember that the 
adversarial system is still widely accepted as the best and truest form of justice and therefore 
restorative justice may have to exist and operate within the restraints of the principles of 
retributive justice. A purist definition of restorative justice can be helpful when establishing the 
groundwork for new operations or assessing the viability of a truly restorative practice. However, 
it is risky to neglect the existence of restorative justice in the traditional adversarial justice 
system. The restorative justice program that is most often referenced throughout this paper refers 
to the Nova Scotia Restorative Justice Program that has been designed under international 
guidelines of restorative justice. There is a variety of different approaches to restorative justice 
and the one that I include in my theoretical framework is a model that exists within the Criminal 
Justice System.  
Restorative justice is an inclusive process whereby all stakeholders involved in an 
incident are invited to have a voice in the appropriate measures that need to be taken to 
rehabilitate the offender, the victim, and the community at large to ensure a holistic approach to 
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justice. A formal conference is held that may consist of the offender, offender supports, the 
victim, victim supports, trained facilitators, community members, police officers, and other 
invested participants who wish to have their voice heard (Zehr, 2002). Restorative justice works 
on many levels to meet the needs of the offender, the victim and the community in a way that 
prioritizes the accountability of the offender.  
Elliott (2011) underlines Susan Sharpe who attempts to define restorative justice as “a 
justice that puts its energy into the future, not into what is past. It focuses on what needs to be 
healed, what needs to be repaid, what needs to be learned in the wake of a crime” (p. 67). Elliott 
asserts that restorative justice “renders the main parties central to the conflict, harm and crime in 
the process, rather than subordinating them to professional and institutional processes” (p. 69). 
She reaffirms the inclusiveness of restorative justice in a couple of ways. First, it asserts that the 
formal conference circle should be as inclusive as possible, including victims, victim supports, 
offender, offender supports, facilitators, community representation, police officers, etc. This 
allows for the truest form of restorative justice whereby all of the stakeholders are able to 
participate in the justice process and rebuild the relationship that has been broken. Second, the 
inclusivity of restorative justice urges that it is effective for all crimes, not only for minor and 
youth crimes but also applicable to violent and serious crimes. This may be difficult to achieve 
due mainly to public support. Restorative justice is much less accepted as a valid means of 
justice for violent and more serious crimes. 
In 1997, Chief Justice of Canada. Edward Bayda, wrote a response to the principles of 
sentencing laid out in s. 718 and critiques its appropriateness in the society in which it exists. 
Bayda problematizes the “purpose” of sentencing that was codified in 1996 in a very succinct 
and important way. The purpose of sentencing in section 718 is “to contribute, along with crime 
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prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe 
society” (p. 3). Bayda argues that the statement that all Canadians live in a “just, peaceful and 
safe society” is completely untrue for marginalized and racialized groups across the country. 
This quotation is entirely appropriate for the situation regarding Aboriginal offenders and 
sentencing. An attempt to remedy a problem within the system that has caused the problem itself 
is evidently not effective. As previously mentioned, Elliott (2011) cautions the use of restorative 
justice to mend an issue with Aboriginal offenders because it neglects to recognize the impacts 
of colonization on the lives of Aboriginal people. The argument made by Elliott (2011) is closely 
linked to that of Bayda (1997) in that both understand the importance of using an alternative 
method to address the over incarceration of Aboriginal peoples. Bayda (1997) highlights the 
mistake of assuming that society is just and peaceful, while Elliott (2011) asserts that retributive 
justice does not follow the values of Aboriginal justice.   
In ‘The Little Book of Restorative Justice’, Zehr (2002) uses the term “truth-telling” that 
occurs within a restorative justice conference (p. 13). In his book, truth-telling refers to the 
transcendence of the experience of crime from the perspective of the victim when they are able 
to tell their story. Many of the cases that I analyzed highlighted the principles of deterrence and 
denunciation as paramount to the purpose of sentencing. However, one must critically determine 
whether or not these principles uphold the needs of the victims. Restorative justice practices 
define the needs of a victim from a third party perspective as problematic. For example, Zehr 
asserts that crime upsets the worldview that many people hold, often creating unwarranted fear 
or uncertainty in an otherwise safe person. Being able to tell their story as a victim, especially in 
the presence of the person who has caused the harm, allows for a deeper healing from both the 
victim’s and the offender's perspective. The victim is able to have their story told in a public 
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setting where their feelings can be validated and the offender is able to understand the 
implications of their actions (Zehr, 2002).  
Using restorative justice as a framework to understand the interpretation of both s. 
718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999 as a response to the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders 
is significant because it exposes the tensions that exist between the traditional retributive and 
Indigenous restorative systems of justice. It provides a unique opportunity to understand the 
failure of s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999 as it exists in the Western system of justice that 
continues to perpetuate the marginalization and criminalization of Aboriginal peoples. 
 
Problem Statement and Research Question 
After a thorough review of the literature surrounding the incarceration rates of Aboriginal people 
in Canada, it is quite apparent that the introduction of s. 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code as a 
response to the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders is both controversial and ineffective. 
Many of the scholars working in this field have highlighted several legal and non-legal factors 
contributing to the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. 
However, while much of the research that I have reviewed has been done across Canada, 
there is no study that was conducted solely in Nova Scotia. I believe this to be a significant 
oversight due to several salient characteristics that shape the Nova Scotia legal system, in 
particular regarding Aboriginal offenders. After the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall Jr., 
a Royal Commission was produced in 1989 to evaluate the legal proceedings inside the Nova 
Scotia legal system to assess how to best address Aboriginal offenders. This Commission 
presented over 80 recommendations to the provincial government and other key institutions 
within Nova Scotia to ameliorate criminal trials involving Aboriginal offenders. This occurred 
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before the introduction of s. 718.2(e) in 1996 and thus it is fair to assume that in Nova Scotia the 
proceedings in courtrooms already had somewhat of a headstart when tackling the question of 
discrimination. This study specifically examines the implications of s. 718.2(e) as they apply in a 
Nova Scotia context post Royal Commission in 1989. My research aims to answer the following 
question: “In the context of the Nova Scotia Legal System, how do the sentencing judges in the 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court interpret s. 718.2(e) and the precedent set in R vs. Gladue 1999?” 
 
Method(ology) 
My goal is to further understand the implications of s. 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code in Nova 
Scotia. To do this, I conducted a qualitative content analysis of ten sentencing decisions that 
came out of the Nova Scotia Provincial Court from 2006–2016. Qualitatively, I examine the 
language used by sentencing judges in Nova Scotia in their sentencing decisions. I excluded 
sentencing decisions from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 
cases involving youth offenders, and any cases that do not deal directly with an Aboriginal 
offender. As much of the literature states, s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999 do not play major 
roles in the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders at the federal level due to the seriousness of the 
crime that is required to be tried at that level. The more serious the crime, the less likely s. 
718.2(e) and Gladue will be referenced and considered in sentencing (Roach and Rudin, 2000). I 
am choosing to analyze sentencing decisions from Nova Scotia due to the unique history of the 
criminal justice system in that province.  
I narrowed my research to analyse only sentencing decisions due to the reach of s. 
718.2(e) as a response to the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. As much of the 
literature suggests, this over incarceration comes from a vast number of factors related to the 
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historical colonization and marginalization of Aboriginal peoples and communities. However, 
the federal government introduced Bill C41 and s. 718.2(e) as a solution to the problem despite 
its relevance to only the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders. For this reason, I decided to only 
analyse sentencing decisions to understand how judges interpret s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 
1999. 
 I conducted a search on www.canLII.org, the public domain where court documents are 
accessible to the general public. I narrowed my search down to include any decisions made in 
accordance to s. 718.2(e) and Gladue in Nova Scotia. In the search terms, I have “Aboriginal” in 
the document text search terms and “R. vs. Gladue 1999” in the cited cases. I conducted a close 
reading of 10 sentencing decision from 2006–2016 from different courts around the province. I 
have three guiding questions that I will use to identify significant information in each document. 
These questions are as follows: 
1. What language does the judge use to describe the offender, case, or incident? 
2. What tensions are expressed in the sentencing decision between the law and R. v. Gladue 
1999? 
3. What forms of resistance exist to the purpose or legitimacy of the principles expressed in 
R. v. Gladue 1999? 
I am looking for consistent patterns that are apparent throughout the material as they apply to 
sentencing decisions of Aboriginal peoples in Nova Scotia.  Due to time restrictions associated 
with the honours project, a close reading of sentencing decisions is a strong method of data 
collection. Learning how Nova Scotia judges interpret s. 718.2(e) and Gladue precedence can 
shed light on the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders in the province and how the unique 
circumstances of the Nova Scotia legal system influence the language they use. Comparing and 
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contrasting the actual sentence received by the offenders to the severity of their crime is 
significant in understanding how relevant the principles of s. 718.2(e) and R. v. Gladue 1999 are 
in sentencing Aboriginal offenders. 
 
Limitations 
The largest limitation to my study was the level of severity in offence that I was able to find. Due 
to the fact that s. 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999 both play little role in more serious cases, I 
was restricted to lower level provincial courts. While it is significant to note the proverbial glass 
ceiling that restricts sentencing provisions for Aboriginal offenders, it is not entirely relevant to 
my study, which is looking at its use in courtrooms. Furthermore, I was restricted by the time 
allotted for this project. A concrete comparison between sentencing provisions and the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Donald Marshall Jr. would be useful however it 
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Chapter 3: Due Process 
 
“I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat  




After conducting a comprehensive search on CanLII, the online public database that documents 
sentencing decisions from across Canada, I narrowed my search to ten cases that dealt with 
Aboriginal offenders in the Nova Scotia Provincial Court. The cases were heard in provincial 
courts in Truro, Shubenacadie, Sydney, Pictou and Kentville. Six different judges presided over 
the ten trials. These included Anne S. Derrick, John G. MacDougall, A.P. Ross, Del W. Atwood, 
Jean M. Whalen, and Alan T. Tufts5. Appendix A includes a table that shows each case, the 
presiding judge, as well as the charges for each defendant. For example, some of the charges 
range from the breach of an undertaking and assault to kidnapping and sexual assault. Each case 
is unique, despite some overlap between certain judges. Within this chapter, I will also highlight 
a judge who presided over two cases separated by two years, with definitive differences in 
sentence given. 
I do not intend my analysis to be generalizable to the rest of Canada nor even other trials 
across Nova Scotia. I have chosen ten cases in order to understand better the proceedings inside 
the Nova Scotia Provincial Court. These ten cases deal with, in some capacity, s. 718.2(e) and R. 
vs. Gladue 1999. The results I present here are valid for the ten cases I have analysed and while 
some aspects may be considered accurate for other cases, it is not my intention nor my objective 
                                                          
5 In many of the cases, the judges will cite and reference other case law and the words of other judges, however I 
will be citing only the sentencing decisions that I have analyzed. It is significant to note that these judges take a 
conscious effort to select a section of the case to present, thus validating my approach to include any information 
that is presented in the sentencing decisions as relevant.  
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to generalize. Throughout my analysis, I noticed particular patterns in the way that sentencing 
judges would address the defendant, the charges laid against the offender, and the invocation of 
both section 718.2(e) and R. vs. Gladue 1999. Specifically, I noted a distinct chronological 
pattern that flowed from the start to finish of the case that I have labelled definition, 
contradiction and justification.  
First, the judge usually begins by highlighting the offender’s past, giving some context to 
the colonization of Aboriginal peoples in Canada. The judge will normally describe the 
marginalized and disadvantaged situation faced by Aboriginal communities as a result of 
colonization in Canada that has led them to the courtroom. Second, I noticed that the judges then 
often contradict themselves in the proceedings after outlining the circumstances of the defendant. 
Finally, in the court cases that I have analysed, the judges justify their sentence by explaining 
that the principles of deterrence and denunciation outweigh the principles of rehabilitation and 
reintegration. 
In this chapter, I will explore the proceedings of the ten cases that I have analyzed as they 
follow the pattern of definition, contradiction, and justification. Through a restorative justice 
lens, the tension that exists between a retributive justice system and a restorative justice system 
will become apparent. 
 
Definition 
Previous studies on the sentencing of Aboriginal peoples across Canada also highlight similar 
patterns in their research. For example, Roach, Kent, and Rudin (2000) discuss how the court 
recognized that there had been an increase in the over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canadian prisons, which could be caused by a host of social disadvantages such as poverty and a 
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lack of employment opportunities. The judges in Nova Scotia that I have reviewed discuss 
similar historic marginalization. Honorable Judge Anne S. Derrick states, “I recognize that like 
so many First Nations people, you have had a difficult and challenging life” (R vs. John Freeman 
Julian, 2006, p. 20). Acknowledgements such as these in the Nova Scotia Provincial Court 
demonstrate that the actors in the legal system are themselves aware of the disadvantage that 
Aboriginal communities face, which may lead to a higher level of involvement within the 
Criminal Justice System. What I find significant is that the Criminal Justice System has failed to 
adopt an adequate solution to address the over incarceration of Aboriginal peoples despite the 
recognition by the judges of the marginalization that exists to this day.  
Furthermore, in 2009, Judge A. P. Ross stated “the situation of the offender, her past and 
present position in her community, the initiative she has shown in advancing her own education, 
and her potential to be an example to young people in classrooms in First Nations communities 
are therefore especially persuasive factors” (R. vs Constance Stevens, p. 9). Much of the 
language used to describe Aboriginal offender’s past speaks to the impacts that colonization has 
had on their communities to this day. An Aboriginal family’s ability to thrive off the land, as is 
traditionally their way of life, becomes stunted when segregated onto a reserve. Moreover, the 
horrendous treatment in federally mandated residential schools that were built to eradicate 
Aboriginal culture has had huge long-term effects on communities. The judges refer to this 
troubled history in their own way and recognize the impacts that this had on each individual 
defendant. For example, Judge John G. MacDougal states “trauma of the event and subsequent 
involvement with the justice system left her disillusioned and with a feeling of powerlessness” (R 
vs. D.M.G. and A.J.G., 2006, p. 3). In this case, the judge understands the relationship between 
the history of the Aboriginal defendants and their involvement with the Criminal Justice System. 
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Bill C41 became law in 1996. The oldest court case that I analyse dates back to 2006, 
therefore years after the implementation of s. 718.2(e) and the decision in R. vs. Gladue 1999. 
Seeing as the discourse around Aboriginal offenders, discrimination, and over-incarceration has 
changed very little (if at all) over a decade, it should be apparent that Bill C41 was not an 
effective response to the over-representation of Aboriginal offenders in Canadian prisons. It is 
possible to note a clear difference in the discourse of one judge on two separate cases five years 
apart. For example, in R vs. Constance Stevens 2009, Judge A. P. Ross describes the past of 
defendant Ms. Stevens in a positive light. He states:  
The situation of the offender, her past and present position in her community, the 
initiative she has shown in advancing her own education, and her potential to be an 
example to young people in classrooms in First Nations communities are therefore 
especially persuasive factors (p. 9) 
 
In this excerpt, the judge outlines the relationship that the defendant has with her heritage and 
conscribes her ability to serve a sentence in the community to her value as a teacher in a First 
Nations context. Judge A. P. Ross describes the defendant’s past as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing. Five years later, in R vs. Dana Smith 2014, Judge A. P. Ross makes assumptions and 
handles the past of the defendant in a very different manner. The judge in this case positions the 
Gladue report in the following way: 
Here I see that he is actually of Ojibwe and Cree descent although his parents became 
members of the Membertou First Nation. I am not going to deal with the report in great 
detail. I am going to touch on just a few parts of it here and there (p. 10) 
 
In this second instance, Judge A. P. Ross undermines the validity of the defendants’ heritage and 
describes his past in a significantly different manner. He places minimal relevance on the Gladue 
report that decreases the weight given to his past as mitigating factors. These two cases, though 
involving the same judge, demonstrate the inconsistencies that exist in the interpretation of s. 
718.2(e) and its ineffectiveness as a response to the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. 
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Interestingly, if one analyses the language used by the judge through the lens of restorative 
justice, it is possible to recognize the needs of the victims of crime as well as unpack the concept 
of “truth-telling” as it applies to the lives on the offenders. The situation of the offenders in both 
cases were described by the judge, in two different capacities. Instead of allowing the defendant 
to have a voice of their own, the judge assumes this role and therefore it is difficult to achieve 
consistency in the “truth-telling.” 
Zehr (2002) astutely identifies the offender as a victim. He states that it is understood 
through many studies that have been conducted that “many offenders have indeed been 
victimized or traumatized in significant ways” (p. 29). It is important to recognize this trauma as 
it may be a large contributing factor to the reason why a person has caused harm. As was 
mentioned earlier, the concept of “truth-telling” is significant in this instance. As Zehr (2002) 
explains, “truth-telling” is the cathartic experience through which an offender participating in a 
restorative justice circle is able to share their story. While this does not justify the offense, it 
allows for those impacted to develop empathy for the offender. However, in the cases that I have 
analyzed, it is the judge who interprets statements from the offender in a way that may make 
assumptions about their past. For example, in R vs. Kathleen Andrea Brooks 2008, Judge Derrick 
states “she has a good relationship with each of her parents, who are no longer together, and 
reported no issues of violence or substance abuse in the home when she was growing up” (p. 8). 
In this statement, Judge Derrick reads from a report that was produced about the defendant, 
without giving the defendant a voice of their own to speak. Removing the voice of the offender 
limits their ability to describe their life experience and does not allow for the Crown or judge to 
accurately view an Aboriginal offender as a victim of colonization.  
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In the Criminal Justice System, there is little voice given to the offender to talk about the 
harm that was caused and any underlying factors that may have contributed to their decision to 
cause harm. However, it is important to allow the offender to have a voice in order for the victim 
to understand exactly what created the space for the offender to commit the act that they did. In a 
very complicated cycle, according to Zehr (2002), restorative justice allows the victim of crime 
to hear the story of the offender which works to decrease the distance between the victim and the 
offender. Another notable example that demonstrates the ways in which an offender is stripped 
of their voice in a retributive justice system is in R vs. Stephen Richard Rose 2013. Judge 
Whalen stated that “he does have a history of gainful employment and has been described as a 
‘reliable employee’” (p. 3). In this excerpt, the judge again speaks for the defendant and 
describes their life to everyone present in the courtroom. As a third party, the judge is unable to 
present the life of the offender in the same detail that the offender would be able to describe 
themselves. The concept of “truth-telling” that emerged from Zehr’s book is lost in the 
retributive justice system. Therefore, one can infer that the implications of s. 718.2(e) are not as 
visible when a third party defines the life of an Aboriginal offender as opposed to the offender 
having the opportunity to talk about their lived experiences and how that has led to the incident. 
Restorative justice highlights how an offender was most likely a victim at one point 
which then motivated their actions. Zehr cautions, however, that this is a controversial topic and 
is not always seen as important by all victims. To justify a crime seems like a crime in itself and 
moreover “it is difficult to explain why some people who are victimized turn to crime and others 
do not” (p. 29). For example, in R vs. Dana Smith 2014, Judge A. P. Ross states that “other 
young people have found themselves in trouble with drugs even though they had excellent 
upbringings” (p. 12). This quotation exemplifies Zehr’s caution about describing the offender as 
    Over-Represented but not Understood  37 
 
a victim. Judge Ross demonstrates this caution by pointing out that a person’s upbringing does 
not necessarily account for their actions. It is evident that some victims of crime may be 
unsatisfied with the story of the offender because they are simply locked into the traditional 
punitive way of thinking and feel obligated to see a fit punishment for the offender.  
Furthermore, Zehr states that “because the community is involved, discussions within the 
circle are often more wide-ranging than in the other forms” (p. 53). In the situation of Aboriginal 
offenders and the description of the disadvantage that they have in society, I believe it is fair to 
show how Aboriginal people in general have been victimized by the Criminal Justice System and 
the Western ideals of justice. For example, in R vs. Stephen Joseph Dakota Maloney 2013, Judge 
Del W. Atwood states “The court takes judicial notice of the broad, systemic, cultural and 
background factors affecting members of First Nations communities who come into conflict with 
the law” (p. 2). Judge Atwood recognizes the broader injustice that is felt by an Aboriginal 
offender who finds themselves involved in the Criminal Justice System. Inside the retributive 
model of justice, victims are more likely to want a punishment that is fitting of the crime 
committed by the offender because they are unable to empathize. Aboriginal offenders by 
definition have been marginalized and disadvantaged in a way that has affected their ability to 
live a productive life and therefore I believe the restorative model of justice is more appropriate 
when a case involves an Aboriginal offender.  
By first defining the situation of the defendant, the judge is able to identify why they will 
include s. 718.2(e) and R vs. Gladue 1999 in their decision. Section 718.2(e) mandates that the 
judge considers the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders so they describe the defendant’s past 
as a means to find mitigating factors in sentencing. However, as will be evident in the following 
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section, there is usually some form of contradiction following the description of the defendants 
past by the judge. 
 
Contradiction 
Throughout my analysis, a pattern of contradiction emerges in the form of a rebuttal to the 
discourse around the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. After defining or describing the 
disadvantage and marginalization experienced by Aboriginal people, the judge or the Crown may 
present a contradiction of this understanding. For example, in R. vs. Stephen Richard Rose 2013, 
the judge asserts that, “the defendant’s problem has been drugs and alcohol for a very long time. 
Those addictions far outweigh any problems he may have encountered being an Aboriginal 
person” (p. 5). Following the judge, the Crown argues that “the Gladue factors were relevant 
when the defendant was younger, not older… and that the defendant has risen above his 
difficulties” (p. 5). In this excerpt, the Crown undermines the Aboriginality of the defendant by 
neglecting to recognize the legitimacy of the impacts of the colonization of Aboriginal peoples. 
Later in the case, Judge Jean M. Whalen sympathizes with defendant Stephen Rose. He states, 
“Aboriginal defendants are not required to establish a direct nexus between their cultural heritage 
or personal antecedents and their conflict with the law” (R. vs. Stephen Richard Rose, 2013, p. 
10). The judge continues to say that “Stephen Richard Rose has personally experienced the 
adverse impact of many factors continuing to plague Aboriginal communities since colonization” 
(p. 1213). Judge Whalen contradicts the Crown and validates the factors affecting the defendant 
as an Aboriginal offender. Imbalances and inconsistencies between the different actors such as 
demonstrated above in the courtroom are frequent. 
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However, these contradictions may also exist in the rhetoric of the same actor. For 
example, Judge A. P. Ross explains that “the Gladue report I think is written primarily for the 
Court’s benefit. However, I would like to think and it is reasonable to think that it may also serve 
to give Mr. Smith himself some measure of self-understanding that he might not gain otherwise” 
(R. vs. Dana Smith, 2014, p. 10). Ross asserts this briefly after stating: “Gladue factors on Mr. 
Smith’s part do not necessarily justify a different sentence but they provide necessary context for 
understanding and evaluating case specific information provided by counsel” (p. 8). In this 
instance, Ross diminishes the value of a Gladue report, a binding document meant to provide 
context in sentencing for a particular offense that has occurred. Instead, the judge views the 
report as nothing more than a learning opportunity for the defendant. 
As previously highlighted by Elliott (2011), a restorative model of justice is designed to 
address the future of the offender and to repair and learn from the incident in a meaningful way. 
In the retributive Criminal Justice System, the emphasis is placed on past actions and the 
sentencing deserving of the offender. The tension that exists between these two models is 
exemplified when Honorable Judge Jean M. Whalen stated that “in crafting the appropriate 
sentence the Court must have regard to the factors set out in the Code as well as the nature of the 
offence committed and the personal circumstances of the offender” (R vs. Stephen Richard Rose, 
2013, p. 78). The judge in this case follows the discourse around the social disadvantage of 
Aboriginal communities, however, he first highlights a responsibility to consider the Criminal 
Code and the nature of the offence. In essence, the judge contradicts himself by placing a 
hierarchy on the factors that must be considered in sentencing an Aboriginal offender. 
Furthermore, in the most recent case that I analysed from 2016, Judge Atwood asserts: 
The court is certainly aware of the fact that, as offences become more prevalent and 
serious, the sentences imposed upon members of the First Nations communities will 
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come to approximate more closely the sentences imposed ordinarily upon non-Aboriginal 
offender (R vs. Leroy David Denny, p. 7) 
 
This excerpt is significant because it not only highlights the tension that exists between the 
retributive and restorative models of justice, it demonstrates the limits that surround the 
interpretation of section 718.2(e). Atwood perpetuates the fact that as the seriousness of a crime 
increases, weight given to the mitigating factors of Aboriginal offenders decreases. This 
pronounced hierarchy accounts for the inability of sentencing judges to apply section 718.2(e) 
and the precedence set by R vs. Gladue in more serious cases involving Aboriginal offenders. 
In the most serious case that I have analysed, R vs. Gordon Frank Nickerson 2013, the 
offender kidnapped and sexually assaulted two female victims. This was not his first charge of 
kidnapping. I was most interested to see how the judge would refer to the Aboriginal status of the 
offender. In this case, Judge Alan T. Tufts began by stating: 
Mr. Nickerson was conflicted around his Aboriginal heritage because of his fair skin 
colour, hair and eyes. He felt he was not fully accepted in the Aboriginal community but 
at the same time viewed by the white community as a Native person (p. 26) 
 
The description of the identity crisis that affected the offender demonstrates an 
acknowledgement of the negative impact that colonization has had on him throughout his past. 
The judge continued to state that “Gladue considerations thus only receive predominant 
weighting in an s. 753(4) [Dangerous Offender] sentencing if the public can reasonably be 
protected with a sentence which is motivated by Gladue considerations” (p. 48). In this instance, 
the judge contradicts himself by first outlining the role that his Aboriginal status has played in 
the lifestyle that he leads and then continuing to undermine the validity of his circumstances by 
highlighting the nature of the offense. Referring back to the definition of retributive justice 
provided by Elliott (2011), Judge Tufts is unable to adequately impose section 718.2(e) due to 
    Over-Represented but not Understood  41 
 
the priority given to the seriousness of the event. Interestingly, in this instance, it is the judge 
who must decide whether an offender is a danger to the greater public; the public has no voice to 
decide for themselves whether or not they believe the offender is dangerous. In a restorative 
model of justice, the perspective of the community would be heard and a more accurate picture 
of the dangerousness of the offender would be visible. 
Sentencing judges who wish to address the over incarceration of Aboriginal peoples 
consistently contradict themselves because they are still bound under a retributive model of 
justice that prioritizes the principles of deterrence and denunciation before rehabilitation and 
reintegration. For example, in R vs. Kathleen Andrea Brooks 2008, Judge Derrick states that 
“Gladue, Wells, and Kakekagamick make it clear that more violent and serious offences will 
likely merit similar sentences for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders” (p. 21). In this case, 
Judge Derrick is unable to interpret accurately s. 718.2(e) and the defendant as an Aboriginal 
person as a mitigating factor because the case law that she cited delineated the limits of 
sentencing provisions. The more serious the crime gets, the less likely the judge will consider the 
situation of the offender as a mitigating factor. After the contradiction of the situation of the 
offender and the ineffective interpretation of s. 718.2(e), the judge often justifies their sentence. 
This justification normally emerges from the principles of deterrence and denunciation that are 
paramount in the retributive justice system. 
 
Justification 
Following a contradiction in trial, the judge will determine the sentence that is fitting for the 
crime and justify their decision. Before coming to a final decision, the judge will hear from both 
Crown and Defense to understand their opinions on a just sentence. Through most of the cases, 
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the Crown will present a sentence they feel is fitting of the offense with a rebuttal of the Defense 
who will present their recommended sentence for the offender. For example, in R vs. Kathleen 
Andrea Brooks 2008, the defendant was charged with assault. The Crown recommended a 
twelve-month prison sentence while the Defence submitted that the defendant should serve a 
four-month conditional sentence in the community. In this particular case, Judge Anne S. Derrick 
recognized that “there is a reasonable alternative to sending Ms. Brooks to jail. A jail sentence 
will remove the defendant from her community and prevent her from having a role in holding her 
to account” (p. 30). This observation is significant in this case because it demonstrates that the 
judge is aware of the implications that serving a sentence in the community can have to hold the 
offender accountable to their actions. As previously mentioned by Zehr (2012), accountability is 
an integral part of restorative justice and it is important that an offender be held accountable for 
their actions. In this case, Judge Derrick decided to follow the suggestion of both Crown and 
Defence and gave a final sentence of twelve months conditional sentence to be served in the 
community followed by eight months’ probation. When sentencing in favor of the Crown, the 
judge most often decides to highlight the principles of deterrence and denunciation in lieu of 
rehabilitation and reintegration. In this case, the judge found a balance between both the 
retributive and restorative justice. 
Two of the ten cases that I analysed were presided by Judge Anne S. Derrick. Two years 
before R. vs Brooks 2008, Judge Anne S. Derrick presided over R vs. John Freeman Julian 2006. 
In the earlier case, the defendant had been charged of assault among other charges such as 
breaching an undertaking and probation. The assault in this case, however, was one of domestic 
violence, and the resulting sentence is indicative of the offence. After hearing from both Crown 
and Defence, and presenting the Gladue report that determines the influence of the defendant’s 
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Aboriginal status on the incident, Judge Derrick gave a sentence of fourteen months in prison 
(less the six months already served) with two years of probation. The probation had strict 
conditions such as not being permitted to be present at Indian Brook, and follow treatment orders 
as given by the probation officer. Finally, Judge Derrick stated that “deterrence and denunciation 
in cases of domestic violence must be foregrounded and emphasized” (R. vs. John Freeman 
Julian, 2006, p. 16). Judge Derrick’s sentence highlights the principles of deterrence and 
denunciation above that of rehabilitation and reintegration. She justifies this by underlining the 
nature of the offence and the seriousness of domestic violence. The inconsistencies that exist 
between the interpretation of s. 718.2(e) and Gladue by the same judge just two years apart 
exemplifies the ineffectiveness of sentencing provisions as a response to the over incarceration 
of Aboriginal offenders. 
Furthermore, in R vs. Stephen Joseph Dakota Maloney 2013, Judge Del W. Atwood 
further perpetuates the idea that as the seriousness of the crime increases, their ability to 
effectively use section 718.2(e) as a mitigating factor decreases. He asserts: 
Although I do take into account Mr. Maloney’s status as a member of a First Nation 
community, I do apply the principles set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Jacko 2010; that case dealt with an Aboriginal offender, and the Court held that, as the 
seriousness of an offence elevates, there will follow as a consequence greater parity with 
sentences imposed upon non-Aboriginal offenders. (p. 4)  
 
This quotation further demonstrates the continual justification that exists in the ten cases that I 
have analysed when giving a sentence in favor of the prosecution. In 2006, Judge John G. 
MacDougall spoke about the defendants and the “horrendous experiences suffered by both 
accused in their early lives” (R. vs D.M.G. and A.J.G., p. 2). However, he continues to say that 
“neither the pre-sentence report nor the Gladue reports suggest D.M.G. has expressed particular 
interest in her native heritage” (p. 21). The second excerpt justifies his sentence of two years less 
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a day on house arrest with a host of conditions to follow. While the judge is in fact considering 
the disadvantaged situation of Aboriginal offenders, he emphasizes the principles of deterrence 
and denunciation and then justifies this sentence with undermining the level of “interest” that the 
accused has of her Aboriginal heritage.  
Previous literature also highlights the legitimacy of Aboriginal status in legal 
proceedings. Kent Roach (2014) states that despite R vs. Ipeelee 2012 setting a precedence for 
the broader legacy of residential schools being taken into account for aboriginal offenders, there 
are still a large number of criminal courts that have required an Aboriginal offender to establish a 
direct relationship between their crime and residential schools. In some cases, “the accused were 
successful in demonstrating a direct causal connection between their residential school 
experience and their crime. For example, a survivor who started drinking again as a result of the 
stress of his civil residential-school claim received a conditional sentence” (p. 585). In this case, 
Roach posits that a judge may be unable to see the historical marginalization of Aboriginal 
peoples as a mitigating factor in sentencing unless a direct link between the crime and 
discrimination exists. In R vs. Constance Stevens 2009, Judge A. P. Ross states: 
This sentence is also informed by R. v. Gladue … I say this not in the sense that her 
circumstances and background are causal factors for her crime. Rather, it is the shift of 
emphasis away from deterrence towards the restorative and remedial aspects of sentence 
that I have in mind. (p. 8) 
 
This excerpt demonstrates the inability for Judge Ross to perceive the systematic disadvantage 
and marginalization experienced by Aboriginal communities to be a factor in an offense 
committed by the defendant. Further in the case, Judge Ross asserts that “apart from the issue of 
whether to jail an offender, does Gladue assist in deciding what form of sentence is fit and 
appropriate?” (p. 9). The implications of s. 718.2(e) and R vs. Gladue 1999 were intended to 
identify the historical disadvantage that Aboriginal communities experience as a direct result of 
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colonization. Instead, Judge Ross is unable to see past its use as a deciding factor whether there 
is a sentence of incarceration. Whether or not a direct causal link can be identified between the 
crime and an incident influences the justification of judges when sentencing an Aboriginal 
offender in Nova Scotia. While Gladue reports in Nova Scotia are not always interpreted 
appropriately and therefore the weight given to Aboriginal status as a mitigating factor is 
inconsistent and inadequate.  
 Throughout my analysis, the tension between the retributive justice system and provision 
718.2(e) are evident. The values of deterrence and denunciation that are integral to the retributive 
justice system contradict the values of rehabilitation and reintegration that emerge through 
section 718.2(e). For example, in R vs. Nickerson 2013, Honorable Chief Judge Alan T. Tufts 
states “however, the Gladue principles do not override the fundamental purpose of the 
Dangerous Offender provisions – the protection of the public … Gladue considerations thus only 
receive predominant weighting in an s. 753(4) [Dangerous Offender] sentencing if the public can 
be reasonably protected with a sentence which is motivated by Gladue considerations” (p. 48). 
This decision by Tufts is representative of the majority of high-profile offences that undergo 
scrutiny through s. 718.2(e) and R. vs Gladue 1999. A hierarchy is placed upon the factors that 
influence sentencing and often the principles of deterrence and denunciation come out on top. 
This particular case is relevant because of the nature of the crime. Nickerson, the accused, had 
kidnapped two female victims and sexually assaulted them on multiple occasions. As this is not 
the first offence of this nature for Nickerson, it was recommended that he be identified as a 
Dangerous Offender under s. 753(4) of the Criminal Code. The judge justifies this by 
highlighting that the protection of the public is of utmost concern. Automatically the judge has 
excluded the offender as a member of the public and speaks for the community in assuming that 
    Over-Represented but not Understood  46 
 
they felt unsafe. Whether or not the community did feel unsafe would be better decided within 
the community instead of by the judge acting as a representative of the community.  
Within the retributive justice system, s. 718.2(e) and R. vs Gladue 1999 principles are not 
prioritized due to the other factors that must be considered. Alternatively, in a restorative justice 
setting, the victims, the community-at-large, and legal officials would have been able to come 
together to decide the fate of offenders and to evaluate exactly what led to this offence. While it 
is uncertain whether an alternative sentence would have been administered through restorative 
justice, it is undeniable that the situation of Aboriginal offenders would have played a larger role 
in the sentence. The voice of the offender and the community would have been heard and I 
believe these to be important perspectives concerning an Aboriginal offender due to the 
circumstances of their situation. 
 In essence, it is the justification that demonstrates the inability of sentencing judges to 
adequately interpret s. 718.2(e) when sentencing Aboriginal offenders. As they are still bound by 
the principles of deterrence and denunciation within the retributive justice system, sentencing 
judges are unable to assess the circumstances of an Aboriginal person as a mitigating factor. 
After defining the situation of the defendant and subsequently contradicting this discourse, the 
judge finally justifies their decision within the retributive justice system as the greatest priority. 
In this chapter, I have discussed the three themes that I have discovered through my 
analysis of the ten sentencing decisions from the Nova Scotia Provincial Court. Through a 
comparison with previous literature as well as the tension between retributive and restorative 
justice, it is possible to understand the implications of section 718.2(e) and R vs. Gladue 1999 in 
Nova Scotia. In the next and final chapter, I will be making final comparisons as well as 
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conclude my thoughts on the use of sentencing provisions as a response to the over incarceration 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
“There is no crueler tyranny than that which is perpetuated under the shield of law and in the 
name of justice”  Charles de Montesquieu 
 
 
Aboriginal justice remains a controversial topic that is both heavily debated and increasingly 
important. With such a large over representation in Canadian prisons, Aboriginal communities 
continue to face marginalization, discrimination, and disadvantage from all levels of government. 
While governments have recognized the horrific past and present that Aboriginal people endure 
as a result of colonization, their response has been both inappropriate and inadequate. In order to 
address the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canada, the Federal government 
introduced sentencing provisions through Bill C41 in 1996 that defined the principles of 
sentencing. The provisions also mandated sentencing judges to consider the situation of all 
Aboriginal offenders. These provisions were further solidified in 1999 through the Supreme 
Court case of R. vs. Gladue 1999. In essence, the Federal government targeted sentencing as the 
intersection in the justice system that is responsible for the over incarceration of Aboriginal 
peoples.  
The difference between retributive and restorative justice is key to the discussion around 
Aboriginal over incarceration. Though traditional retributive justice systems may vary from 
nation to nation, they are still built on similar key principles of rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Aboriginal justice is akin to restorative justice in that it works with the community to understand 
the harm that has been caused and to identify exactly how that harm can be repaired and the 
offender can rejoin the community as a productive member of society. 
 Furthermore, it is ineffective to attempt to solve a problem that is caused by the Criminal 
Justice System within that same system. Retributive justice was born of the era of colonization 
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and therefore shares some responsibility for the creation of the many social problems that face 
Aboriginal peoples (Monchalin, 2016). Throughout this paper, it is clear that a tension exists 
between a retributive justice system and a restorative justice system. Retributive justice 
continues to perpetuate social disadvantage for Aboriginal peoples and maintains their 
community’s low level of autonomy. Instead, the Federal government must focus on alternative 
forms of justice to begin healing Canada’s relationship with Aboriginal peoples instead of 
targeting sentencing as the primary issue. 
Throughout this project, I have learned more about myself and my identity as an 
Aboriginal person. I am honoured to have learned more about the problems that continue to 
plague Aboriginal communities across Canada and, more specifically, in Nova Scotia. I have 
been able to better understand the relationship between the Federal Government and the interests 
of Aboriginal people. Though recognizing the distinct over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders 
in prisons across Canada, it is evident that introducing sentencing legislation through section 718 
was not effective as a solution. Instead of turning to the current Criminal Justice System that 
promotes a retributive model of justice, it is necessary to look at alternative means by which they 
can address discrimination toward Aboriginal offenders.  
The conversation around Aboriginal offenders in Canada and the over-representation of 
Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons have become key social and political concerns in 
Canadian society. However, since the introduction of sentencing reforms in 1996, many scholars 
have shifted their focus in understanding the effectiveness of legislation used as a response to the 
over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders. It is important that this scholarly discussion 
continues, but I think that it is important that researchers do not lose sight of the main goal that is 
held throughout: decreasing the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in a decolonizing, 
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anti-oppressive manner. Research should not simply add to the body of literature on Aboriginal 
communities or produce a project that moves little ground in regards to over incarceration. It is 
important that researchers carefully design their research, collaboratively with the communities 
they are working with, so as to be as beneficial to that particular community as possible. In 
closing, it is important that actors in the Criminal Justice System do not accept s. 718.2(e) as the 
panacea of the over incarceration of Aboriginal offenders and that instead they look to alternative 
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Case Specifics Charges 
R. vs. John 
Freeman Julian 
Honourable Judge Anne S. Derrick 
Truro, Nova Scotia 
November, 2006 
s. 267(b)  assault causing bodily 
harm 
s. 733.1  failure to keep the 
peace 
s 145(5.1)  breach of an 
undertaking 
R. vs. D.M.G. 
and A.J.G 
Honourable Judge John. G. MacDougall 
Truro, Nova Scotia 
November, 2006 
s. 236  accessory after the fact to 
manslaughter 
R. vs. Kathleen 
Andrea Brooks 
Honourable Judge Anne S. Derrick 
Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia 
September, 2008 
s. 267(b)  assault causing bodily 
harm 





Honourable Judge A. P. Ross 
Sydney, Nova Scotia 
September, 2009 
s. 267(a)  assault with a weapon 
 
R. vs. Stephen 
Joseph Dakota 
Maloney 
Honourable Judge Del W. Atwood 
Pictou, Nova Scotia 
April, 2013 
s. 430(4)  mischief in relation to 
property 
s. 333.1  theft of a motor vehicle 
s. 334(a)  theft of goods valued 
at more than five thousand dollars 
R. vs. Stephen 
Richard Rose 
Honourable Judge Jean M. Whalen 
Sydney, Nova Scotia 
October, 2013 
s. 261.1(1)(a)  breach of a 
recognizance 
s. 145(3)  breach of an 
undertaking 
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s. 348(1)(b)  breaking and 
entering a place and committing 
an indictable offence 
R. vs. Gordon 
Frank 
Nickerson 
Honourable Chief Judge Alan T. Tufts 
Kentville, Nova Scotia 
October 2013 and January 2014 
s. 279(1.1)(b)  kidnapping with 
intent to cause her to be confined 
(two counts) 
s. 272(2)(b)  commit a sexual 
assault while carrying an imitation 
weapon (two counts) 
s. 348(1)(d)  break and enter and 
commit an indictable offence 
s. 159(1)  commit non 
consensual anal intercourse (two 
counts) 
s. 811(a)  breach a peace bond 
s. 266(a)  assault (two counts) 
s. 249(2)(a)  operate a motor 
vehicle on a highway in a manner 
that was dangerous to the public 
s. 252(1)  have care and control 
of a vehicle that was involved in 
an accident with a vehicle, with 
intent to escape civil or criminal 
liability 
R. vs. Dana 
Smith 
Honourable Judge A. P. Ross 
Sydney, Nova Scotia 
September, 2014 
s. 344(b)  robbery 
s. 90  carrying a concealed 
weapon 
s. 733.1  breach of probation 
s. 351(1)  possession of break-in 
instrument 
R.. vs Valerie 
Claudette Sack 
Honourable Judge Del W. Atwood 
Pictou, Nova Scotia 
December, 2014 
s. 145(3)(a)  breach of an 
undertaking 
s. 334(b)  theft below five 
thousand dollars 
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s. 354  possession of stolen 
property (ten counts) 
R. vs. Leroy 
David Denny 
Honourable Judge Del W. Atwood 
Pictou, Nova Scotia 
April 2016 
s. 254(5)  failure to comply with 
a breathalyzer (two counts) 
 
 
 
 
 
